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Abstract. Many existing face anti-spoofing (FAS) methods focus on
modeling the decision boundaries for some predefined spoof types. How-
ever, the diversity of the spoof samples including the unknown ones hin-
ders the effective decision boundary modeling and leads to weak gen-
eralization capability. In this paper, we reformulate FAS in an anomaly
detection perspective and propose a residual-learning framework to learn
the discriminative live-spoof differences which are defined as the spoof
cues. The proposed framework consists of a spoof cue generator and
an auxiliary classifier. The generator minimizes the spoof cues of live
samples while imposes no explicit constraint on those of spoof samples
to generalize well to unseen attacks. In this way, anomaly detection is
implicitly used to guide spoof cue generation, leading to discriminative
feature learning. The auxiliary classifier serves as a spoof cue amplifier
and makes the spoof cues more discriminative. We conduct extensive
experiments and the experimental results show the proposed method
consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art methods. The code will be
publicly available at https://github.com/vis-var/lgsc-for-fas.
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1 Introduction
Face authentication applications have been widely used in our daily lives. How-
ever, hackers may fraud the face recognition systems by the means of presen-
tation attack (PA) such as printed photos (i.e. print attack), digital images /
videos (i.e. replay attack) and 3D facial masks (i.e. 3D mask attack). To this
end, face anti-spoofing (FAS) is developed to guarantee the security of the face
recognition system.
Traditional methods employ hand-crafted features such as LBP [24], HOG
[19] and SIFT [27] to extract the texture information and use shallow classifiers
? This work was done when Yang Chen was an intern at Baidu Inc.
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2to model the decision boundary. The hand-crafted features used by such meth-
ods are not discriminative enough and the classifiers performance is limited. To
take advantage of better feature representations, the early deep learning based
methods [34,35] utilize CNN to learn more discriminative features and formulate
the spoofing detection as a binary classification problem. However, these meth-
ods tend to overfit on the predefined datasets and cannot generalize well. Most
recent deep learning based methods [22,30,32] focus on improving the model’s
generalization capacity and achieve promising results.
The limited generalization capacity of FAS lies in the diversity of the spoof
samples including the unknown ones. Though one can assume that the live sam-
ples share the same nature and can be categorized into one class, the spoof
samples are generally diverse due to the wide variety of attack mediums. To
relieve the spoof diversity’s influence on the decision boundary modeling, we
reformulate FAS from an anomaly detection perspective and assume the live
samples belong to a closed-set while the spoof ones are outliers of the closed-set
and belong to an open-set. Based on the hypothesis, we define the spoof cues as
the discriminative features that can be used to differentiate the closed-set and
the open-set.
In this paper, the spoof cues are formulated as a feature map that has the
same size as the input image. The spoof cue map is prone to be a non-zero map
for a spoof image while an all-zero map for a live image. Unlike the compact
embeddings which are traditionally used for classification (live vs. spoof), spoof
cues can effectively encode the spatial information. To learn the spoof cue map,
we propose the residual-learning framework that consists of a spoof cue generator
and an auxiliary classifier. In the spoof cue generator, we set explicit regression
loss for live samples to minimize the magnitudes of their spoof cues while setting
no explicit constraint on the spoof samples, leading their corresponding entries
to any real numbers. In this way, the spoof cues of live and spoof samples are
naturally separable. In addition, we adopt the multi-scale feature-level metric
learning on the generator to promote live-live intra-class compactness and live-
spoof inter-class separability. Then, the spoof cue map and the input image,
which are skip-connected in a residual learning manner, are fed to an auxiliary
classifier, further improving the discriminative feature learning. The spoof cue
maps and their distributions are shown in Fig. 1. The spoof cue maps are di-
rectly utilized to calculate the score of an input sample being spoof in the test
phase. The experimental results show that the spoof cue maps can be utilized
to separate the live closed-set and spoof open-set effectively.
Our contributions can be summarized as:
1. We reformulate FAS from an anomaly detection perspective and propose a
spoof cue generator, which models the spoof cues of live samples on closed-set
and spoof samples on open-set by minimizing the magnitudes of spoof cues
for live samples while imposing no explicit constraint on the spoof samples.
2. We deploy a residual learning framework to make the spoof cues more dis-
criminative and further boost the spoof cues’ generalization capability.
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Fig. 1. The illustration of the spoof cue maps and the distribution of the learned
feature embeddings. Left: the input images and the generated spoof cue maps. Right:
the distribution of the learned feature embeddings visualized using the t-SNE. More
details will be given in Section 4.4.
3. Without additional depth or temporal information, the proposed framework
outperforms the state-of-the-art on the popular RGB anti-spoofing datasets.
2 Related Work
2.1 Face anti-spoofing methods
The traditional face anti-spoofing methods use the hand-crafted features, such
as LBP [24], HOG [19] and SIFT [27] to represent the image texture and use
the traditional classifiers like SVM for binary classification. Besides, some works
also adopt the feature extractors in the different color spaces like HSV and
YCbCr [6] to tackle face anti-spoofing. However, the hand-crafted features are
specially designed for several defined types of spoof and are not robust enough to
variable conditions such as the illumination and the presentation attack types.
Motion cues like eye-blinking [26] and head movement [18] are also used when
the temporal information is given. However, the performance of these methods
drop drastically on the video replay attack.
With the development of CNN, many researchers start to use CNN as a fea-
ture extractor to exploit the discriminative representations in RGB images and
formulate face anti-spoofing as a binary classification problem [34]. Moreover,
Feng et al. [11] utilize LSTM in temporal information modeling for better classi-
fication performance. Despite their good performances in the intra-dataset test,
these methods are easy to overfit and have poor generalizability.
Most recent methods can be categorized into three classes: the additional
information-based methods, the domain shift methods, and the few-shot meth-
ods. These methods are designed to further boost the models’ generalizability.
Liu et al. [22] use pseudo-depth to supervise the model training. Shao et al.
[32] cast FAS as a domain generalization problem and develop a Regularized
Fine-grained Meta-learning framework. Qin et al. [30] propose a novel Adaptive
Inner-update Meta Face Anti-Spoofing (AIM-FAS) method.
42.2 Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection is the task to identify the unusual samples from a set of nor-
mal data. It has been widely used in a variety of applications such as fraud de-
tection [1], cyber-intrusion detection [20], health care [33] and video surveillance
[4]. In the face anti-spoofing area, Liu et al. [3] formulate the face PAD problem
as anomaly detection and put forward a one-class classifier. Nikisins et al. [25]
use a Gaussian Mixture model-based anomaly detector. Arashloo et al. [2] use
client-specific information in a one-class anomaly detection formulation to im-
prove the model’s performance significantly. Perez et al. [28] reformate the FAS
problem from an anomaly detection perspective and put forward a deep metric
learning model with triplet focal loss.
3 Our Approach
3.1 Preliminaries
Anomaly detection. Anomaly detection (AD) is the task of identifying the
unusual samples in a set of normal data. The typical AD methods attempt to
learn a compact description of the normal data in an unsupervised manner. Take
the deep SVVD [31] as an example, for input space (X ⊆ Rd) and output space
(Z ⊆ Rp), let φ(·;W) : X → Z be a neural network with L hidden layers and
corresponding set of weights W = {W1, ...,WL}. The objective is to train the
neural network φ to learn a transformation that minimizes the volume of a data-
enclosing hypersphere in output space Z centered on a predetermined point c.
Given N (unlabeled) training samples (x1, ..., xN ⊆ X ), the objective is:
min
W
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖φ(xi;W)− c‖2 + λ
2
L∑
`=1
∥∥W`∥∥2
F
, λ > 0, (1)
Once the network is trained, the anomaly score for a test point x is given by the
distance from φ(x;W) to the center of the hypersphere:
s(x) = ‖φ(x;W)− c‖ . (2)
In FAS, though the live samples are assumed to share the same nature, the
spoof samples can be very diverse due to the wide variety of attack mediums.
Such diversity makes it hard for the spoof samples to form a compact region in
the feature representation space and further hinders the effective decision bound-
ary modeling between live and spoof samples. Besides, the decision boundary
learned by the known spoof samples may have poor performance on the unseen
spoof samples. Motivated by the AD method, we assume the live samples be-
long to a closed-set while the spoof samples are outliers from this closed-set and
belong to an open-set. Therefore, the distribution of the live samples is assumed
to lie in a compact sphere in the learned feature representation space while the
spoof samples far away from the center of the live sphere. Specifically, for the
face anti-spoofing model’s input space (X ⊆ Rd) and output space (Z ⊆ Rp).
Let φ(·;W) : X → Z be a neural network with L hidden layers and correspond-
ing set of weights W = {W1, ...,WL}. Given Nl live samples (x1, ..., xNl ⊆ X ),
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Fig. 2. The proposed network architecture.
Ns spoof samples (y1, ..., yNs ⊆ X ), let c be the center of the live samples in the
output space Z, the objective is:
min
W
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
‖φ(xi;W)− c‖2 , (3)
max
W
1
Ns
Ns∑
i=1
‖φ(yi;W)− c‖2 . (4)
In the test phase, the score for a test sample t being spoof can be given by
the distance from φ(t;W) to the center of the live hypersphere:
s(x) = ‖φ(t;W)− c‖ . (5)
In our proposed method, we utilize the explict regression supervision on the
live samples to achieve the optimization goal of Eq. 3 and the implict metric
learning supervision on the live and spoof samples to ahieve the optimazation
goal of Eq. 4. In the test phase, we directly use the distance between the test
samples and the predfined live closed set’s center in the feature space to calculate
the score of a sample being spoof.
Residual learning. Deep residual learning [12] has gained great success in
visual recognition, the residual learning method recasts the desired underlying
mapping H(x) into H(x) = F (x) + x and learns the effective residual feature
representation.
In FAS, the discriminative differences between the live and spoof samples
may be caused by the intrinsic properties of the mediums such as printed pa-
pers or screens. Motivated by the residual learning method, the discriminative
differences between live and spoof samples can be regarded as the residual of the
spoof samples and the live samples. We define the discriminative differences as
spoof cues and assume the spoof cues only exist in the spoof samples. In order to
learn the spoof cues, we propose a residual learning framework that consists of
a spoof cue generator and an auxiliary classifier. In the spoof cue generator, we
impose the regression loss on the live samples while put no explicit supervision
6on the spoof samples, which guarantees the spoof cues’ generalization capability.
The auxiliary classifier serves as a spoof cue amplifier in the end-to-end training
process and helps to learn more discriminative spoof cues.
3.2 Spoof cue learning framework
The proposed residual learning framework is illustrated in Fig. 2. It consists of a
spoof cue generator and an auxiliary classifier. In our assumption, the live sam-
ples share some common properties that spoof samples do not have. Therefore,
all the live samples belong to a closed-set while the spoof samples are outliers
from this closed-set but belong to an open-set. The discriminative differences be-
tween the live and spoof samples which are defined as spoof cues can be caused by
the intrinsic properties of the medium carriers such as printed paper or screens.
Our framework aims to learn the discriminative spoof cues and further boost
the spoof cues’ generalization capability.
In the spoof cue generator, we adopt a simple yet effective U-Net to generate
spoof cue maps. In our assumption, the spoof cues only exist in spoof samples.
Thus, for live samples, the spoof cue map should be an all-zero map. For spoof
samples, the spoof cue map should be an unknown non-zero map. To relieve the
spoof diversitys influence on the decision boundary modeling and make the spoof
cue generalized enough, we introduce the pixel-wise regression loss as explicit
supervision only for the live samples. To promote the intra-class compactness in
live samples and the inter-class separability between live and spoof samples, we
introduce the multi-scale triplet loss on the feature embeddings.
In the auxiliary classifier, we feed the spoof cue map and the input image
into the auxiliary classifier in a residual learning manner. The auxiliary classifier
serves as an amplifier in the end-to-end training process and makes the learned
spoof cues more discriminative.
3.3 Spoof Cue Generator
Architecture. In the spoof cue generator, as shown in Fig. 2, we adopt the
U-Net architecture which builds skip connections from encoder to decoder in
multiple scales to generate spoof cues. We choose the ResNet18 [12] pre-trained
on ImageNet [10] as encoder E which contains four Encoder Residual Blocks. Fol-
lowed by E, the decoder D, composed of five Decoder Residual Blocks, decodes
the information back to generate the spoof cues. In each Decoder Residual Block,
the feature map from the previous layer is upsampled by a nearest-neighbor in-
terpolation, following which we add a 2×2 convolution. We aggregate the feature
maps from the symmetric position in the encoder to the decoder by the concate-
nation operation and add an Encoder Residual Block afterward. At the end of
the decoder, a Decoder Residual Block accompanied by a Tanh activation layer
is applied to generate the outputs.
Regression loss. In our assumption, the live samples belong to a closed-set
while the spoof samples are outliers from this closed-set and belong to an open-
set. Therefore, we do not set any preset constraint on the spoof cues and only
7impose constraints on the live ones. Since we assume the spoof cues only exist
in spoof samples, the spoof cue maps should be zero maps for live samples while
remaining unknown for spoof samples. From our perspective, the zero map can
be considered as the center of the live samples in the feature space and the
live-only regression loss achieves the optimization goal of Eq. 3.
Given an RGB image I as input, the spoof cue generator outputs a spoof
cue map of the same size, the spoof cue map C is a zero map for a live sample.
While C remains unknown for a spoof sample. The spoof cue regression loss for
a live sample is the pixel-wise L1 loss, in the formulation of:
Lr =
1
Nl
∑
Ii∈live
||Ci||1, (6)
where Nl is the number of live samples in one batch.
Metric Learning. The metric learning-based loss is designed as an implicit
supervision for spoof samples to promote live-live intra-class compactness and
live-spoof inter-class separability on the feature level, which achieves the opti-
mization goal of Eq. 4. Specifically, we obtain a set of feature vectors {V } by
employing the global average pooling (GAP) on feature maps from layer E5 to
D4 and apply the metric supervision afterward. We use the triplet loss of which
the anchor always belongs to the live class. The metric learning-based loss can
be formulated as:
Lt =
1
T
T∑
i=1
max(d(ai, pi)− d(ai, ni) +m, 0),
d(i, j) = || vi||vi||2 −
vj
||vj ||2 ||2,
(7)
where {ai, pi, ni} denotes the anchor (live), positive (live), negative (spoof) sam-
ples within the ith triplet respectively, T denotes the number of triplets, d(i, j)
represents the euclidean distance between two L2-normalized feature vectors
output by the GAP layer, and m is the pre-defined margin constant.
As for the triplet sampling strategy, we choose the online batch-all triplet
mining proposed in [14]. At each training step, we collect all the valid triplets
within the current batch of data for metric loss computation, the triplets satis-
fying ||d(a, n)− d(a, p)||2 < m.
3.4 Auxiliary Classifier
The success of prior work [13] proves the metric learning based loss in feature
embeddings coupled with classification supervision helps to learn more discrimi-
native features, which inspires us to design the auxiliary classifier. In our residual
learning framework, the auxiliary classifier serves as a spoof cue amplifier and
helps to learn more discriminative spoof cues. After the spoof cue generator,
the generated spoof cue maps C are added back to the input image I to form
the overlayed images S. With S as input, the auxiliary classification loss can be
8formulated as:
La =
1
N
N∑
i=1
zi log qi + (1− zi) log(1− qi), (8)
where N is the number of samples, zi is the binary label and qi is the network
prediction.
In our visualization experiments, we notice that choosing S instead of C as
the input of the auxiliary classifier helps to learn more discriminative spoof cue
maps, which proves the residual learning’s superiority. We discuss the experi-
mental details in Section 4.4.
3.5 Training and Testing
Loss functions. The loss functions of the proposed model are three-fold: the
pixel-wise L1 loss Lr for spoof cue regression on live samples, the triplet loss Lt
and the auxiliary binary classification loss La on both live and spoof samples.
We integrate all these losses and establish the total loss of L during training:
L = α1Lr + α2
∑
k∈{E5−D4}
Lkt + α3La, (9)
where k indexes the layer where we apply the triplet loss, and α1, α2, α3 are the
weights to balance the influence of the different loss components.
Test Strategy. At the test stage, we use the generated spoof cue map instead
of the classifier’s output to evaluate. In Eq. 5, the distance from φ(t;W) to the
center of the live hypersphere is utilized to calculate the spoof score. In our
proposed method the all-zero map can be considered as the center of the live
samples in the feature space. We directly use the spoof cue map to evaluate. We
obtain the spoof cue map Cˆ and define the spoof score as the element-wise mean
of Cˆ magnitude. The spoof score evaluates the probability of the test sample
being spoof:
score = ||Cˆ||1, (10)
The input image is likely to be a spoof one when the spoof score is high.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experiment Settings
In our experiments, we crop the human faces out of the images and feed them to
the proposed framework. For datasets that offer no face location ground truth,
we use the Dlib [16] toolbox as the face detector. We resample the training
examples to keep the live-spoof ratio to 1:1. The training batch size is 32 and
the warm-up learning rate strategy is applied at the first training epoch. We
choose Adam [17] as the optimizer with initial learning rate 1e-3, which decays
every 600 training steps by a factor of 0.95. In the spoof cue generator, we use
Tanh as the activation function for the output layer of the U-Net, so the output
9Table 1. The intra testing results and comparison with the state-of-the-art methods
on 3 protocols of SiW dataset.
Protocol Method APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
1
Auxiliary [22] 3.58 3.58 3.58
STASN [36] – – 1.00
Meta-FAS-DR [38] 0.52 0.50 0.51
Ours 0.00 0.50 0.25
2
Auxiliary [22] 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69
Meta-FAS-DR [38] 0.25±0.32 0.33±0.27 0.29±0.28
STASN [36] – – 0.28±0.05
Ours 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00
3
STASN [36] – – 12.10±1.50
Auxiliary [22] 8.31±3.81 8.31±3.80 8.31±3.81
Meta-FAS-DR [38] 7.98±4.98 7.35±5.67 7.66±5.32
Ours 1.61±1.69 0.77±1.09 1.19±1.39
distributes in the same range with the input image, which is linearly normalized
to [-1, 1]. We set m to 0.5 in the triplet loss and set α1 to α3 as 5, 1 and 5,
respectively. The score threshold in Eq. 10 is set experimentally, and 0.01 is
recommended. Our framework can be trained end-to-end and converges in 20
epochs on all the datasets used in the paper.
As for the metrics, we use Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) which is
half of the summation of Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER)
and Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) for intra-dataset
test on SiW [22] and OULU-NPU [8] datasets:
ACER =
APCER+BPCER
2
. (11)
Note that APCER corresponds to the highest false positive rate in all presenta-
tion attack instruments.
For inter-dataset test between CASIA-MFSD [37] and Replay-Attack [9]
datasets, we use the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) which is the mean of False
Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate (FAR):
HTER =
FRR+ FAR
2
. (12)
4.2 Intra Testing
We carry out the intra testing on SiW and OULU-NPU datasets. The SiW
dataset collects 4478 HD videos from 165 individuals in total. It contains data
in the rich PIE (pose, illumination, and expression) variations. There are four
pre-defined protocols on the SiW dataset to evaluate the generalization for face
anti-spoofing. The results on the test set are reported in Table 1. The state-
of-the-art methods we compare with include Auxiliary [22], STASN [36] and
Meta-FAS-DR [38]. Our method outperforms the state-of-the-art results on all
protocols by a large margin. To be notified, protocol 3 evaluates the model’s
10
Table 2. The intra testing results and comparison with the state-of-the-art methods
on 4 protocols of OULU-NPU dataset.
Protocol Method APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
1
MILHP [21] 8.3 0.8 4.6
STASN [36] 1.2 2.5 1.9
Auxiliary [22] 1.6 1.6 1.6
FaceDs [15] 1.2 1.7 1.5
Ours 0.8 0.0 0.4
2
FaceDs [15] 4.2 4.4 4.3
Auxiliary [22] 2.7 2.7 2.7
GRANDINT [5] 3.1 1.9 2.5
STASN [36] 4.2 0.3 2.2
Ours 0.8 0.6 0.7
3
GRADIANT [5] 2.6±3.9 5.0±5.3 3.8±2.4
FaceDs [15] 4.0±1.8 3.8±1.2 3.6±1.6
Auxiliary [22] 2.7±1.3 3.1±1.7 2.9±1.5
STASN [36] 4.7±3.9 0.9±1.2 2.8±1.6
Ours 1.5±1.4 1.9±1.9 1.7±1.6
4
GRADIANT [5] 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
Auxiliary [22] 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
STASN [36] 6.7±10.6 8.3±8.4 7.5±4.7
FaceDs [15] 5.1±6.3 6.1±5.1 5.6±5.7
Ours 5.8±4.9 1.7±2.6 3.7±2.1
generalization capacity over unknown spoof types and our method obtains con-
siderable performance gain over the state-of-the-art. The experimental results
demonstrate the superior generalization capacity of the proposed method.
The OULU-NPU dataset is a high quality dataset simulating realistic mo-
bile authentication scenarios. It consists of 4950 videos recorded by different
mobile phones with front cameras. OULU-NPU develops four protocols to eval-
uate the model’s generalization. Table 2 compares the performance of our model
with state-of-the-art methods on the OULU-NPU dataset. The state-of-the-art
methods we compare with include GRADIANT [5], MILHP [21] Auxiliary [22],
STASN [36] and FaceDs [15]. The experimental results show that our model has
great generalization ability over unseen environmental conditions, attack medi-
ums, and camera sensors.
4.3 Inter Testing
To demonstrate the generalization capability of our model, we set up inter testing
experiments. Specifically, the model is trained on one dataset and then tested
on the other dataset. The cross-dataset evaluation is challenging as the data
distribution varies a lot on both the live and spoof samples between different
datasets. We perform the inter testing on the CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack
datasets to evaluate the generalization capability of our model. As shown in
Table 3, our method achieves the best results under the HTER metric among
all the state-of-the-art methods. All the state-of-the-art methods perform the
inter test on the CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack datasets except that Liu
11
Table 3. The inter testing results between CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack datasets
and comparison with the state-of-the-art methods. Results under HTER (%) metric
are reported.
Method
Train Test Train Test
CASIA-
MFSD
Replay-
Attack
Replay-
Attack
CASIA-
MFSD
Spectral Cubes [29] 34.4% 50.0%
CNN [35] 48.5% 45.5%
LBP [6] 47.0% 39.6%
Color Texture [7] 30.3% 37.7%
STASN [36] 31.5% 30.9%
FaceDs [15] 28.5% 41.1%
Auxiliary [22] 27.6% 28.4%
Ours 27.4% 23.7%
Table 4. The inter testing results from SiW to OULU-NPU dataset and comparison
with the state-of-the-art methods. Results under ACER (%) metric are reported.
Protocol Method ACER (%)
1
Auxiliary [22] 10.0
Ours 6.5
2
Auxiliary [22] 14.1
Ours 11.4
3
Auxiliary [22] 13.8±5.7
Ours 9.9±8.2
4
Auxiliary [22] 10.0±8.8
Ours 6.7±6.6
et al. [22] additionally performs an inter test from SiW to OULU. According
to Table 3 and Table 4, the proposed method achieves better performance. To
conclude, our method outperforms the state-of-the-art methods on all the con-
ducted inter tests. During the inter test, we notice a slight performance drop
from the high-resolution dataset (CASIA-MFSD) to the low-resolution dataset
(Replay-Attack). As demonstrated in Section 4.5, with high-resolution images
as input, the proposed method takes advantage of the abundant texture infor-
mation, which may be missing on the low-resolution images. On the contrary,
the learned spoof cues from low-resolution images can generalize well to high-
resolution ones, which is worthy of future research.
4.4 Ablation Studies
Influence of Input Image Resolution. In our model, we sample patches from
images as the network input during training. These patches keep the input image
resolution and retain as much texture information as possible. In Table 5, we
compare resizing the cropped faces to 224×224 with the bilinear interpolation
and patching 224×224 the patches from the face images. The experimental result
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Table 5. The influence of input image resolution, regression loss (RL), triplet loss (TL)
and the auxiliary classification (AC). Results on protocol 1 of OULU-NPU dataset are
reported.
Resized
input
Patched
input
RL on live
and spoof
RL on
live
TL on
E5-D4
TL on
E5-SC
AC on
spoof cue
AC on
overlayed
APCER
(%)
BPCER
(%)
ACER
(%)
X X X X 2.1 3.3 2.7
X X X 1.7 3.3 2.5
X X X X 0.2 4.2 2.3
X X X 2.5 0.8 1.7
X X X X 0.8 2.5 1.7
X X X X 1.7 0.0 0.8
X X X X 0.8 0.0 0.4
shows that patched input strategy achieves better ACER metric. The result
is in line with our expectations as our method excavates spoof cues from a
single-frame RGB image without extra supervision such as depth or temporal
information, the local image information is critical to the performance. On the
high resolution dataset like OULU-NPU, the resize operation will blur the image
and bring considerable loss in local details, resulting in a performance drop.
Influence of Implicit Supervisions. In the proposed method we adopt the
triplet loss (TL) and the auxiliary classification (AC) in a joint supervision
manner. In Table 5, we remove the triplet learning and the auxiliary classifier
separately and report their performances. It shows that the model is most likely
to overfitting if only guided by the binary classification supervision. The joint su-
pervision boosts the performance and results in the minimum ACER. To further
validate the influence of the triplet loss on the spoof cue map (SC), we set up
a comparison experiment which alternatively imposes the triplet loss on feature
maps from E5 to SC. The experimental result shows that imposing triplet loss
on feature maps from E5 to D4 achieves better performance.
Influence of Regression Loss. In order to relieve the spoof diversity’s influ-
ence on the decision boundary modeling, we set explicit regression loss (RL) only
for the live samples while setting no regression loss for the spoof ones. To vali-
date the effectiveness of such design, we set up a comparison experiment which
imposes regression loss on both live and spoof samples. To be specific, given an
RGB image I as input, the spoof cue map C is a zero map for a live sample
while an all-one map for a spoof samples. As shown in Table 5, the proposed de-
sign achieves better performance. From our perspective, the predefined explicit
regression loss on the spoof samples may violate the intrinsic spoof diversity and
makes the network easy to overfitting.
Advantage of Auxiliary Supervision. In Table 5, we evaluate the auxiliary
classifier and the residual learning approach’s influence on the network’s perfor-
mance. The residual learning framework achieves the best ACER performance
among all these experiments. For a more intuitive understanding, we present
the spoof cue maps from the models in Fig. 3. The auxiliary classifier ampli-
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on spoof cue maps
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on overlayed images
Fig. 3. The illustration of different types of input and the auxiliary supervision’s ampli-
fication effect on the spoof cue maps. Left: Results with resized and patched images as
input during training. Right: The spoof cue maps and their local details corresponding
to different auxiliary supervision strategies.
fies the spoof cues by enlarging the magnitude of the non-zero values. In our
perspective, the correlations between the spoof cue maps and the input images
are learned and amplified through the residual learning manner. From the local
details column in Fig. 3, our method excavates more local spoof details than
other auxiliary supervision manners and obtains more discriminative spoof cue
representations.
4.5 Visualizations
Visualization of the Spoof Cues. For a more intuitive understanding of what
the spoof cues are, we present the generated spoof cue map in Fig. 3. The spoof
cues respond to the differences between the live and spoof samples, which could
possibly be the color distortion, moire pattern or other spoof patterns. Fig. 3
shows that the spoof cues exhibit some global pattern when the input image
contains a complete face, whereas, for patched input images, the spoof cues
contain more local information. In our perspective, the phenomenon is caused by
our modeling architecture. Multi-scale skip connections from encoder to decoder
and the residual 1×1 Conv in Decoder Residual Block retain image semantics in
decoder feature maps well.
Visualization of the Feature Embeddings. We assume the spoof samples
are outliers of the live set and develop the joint supervision method to promote
the live-live intra-class compactness and the live-spoof inter-class separability.
In Fig. 4, we present the feature embeddings of layer D4 using t-SNE [23] on the
test set of OULU-NPU protocol 1. It shows that all the live samples fall into a
cluster while the spoof samples distribute far from this cluster by a considerable
margin, which is in line with our desired distribution of the live closed-set and
the spoof open-set.
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Fig. 4. The t-SNE representation of feature embeddings of layer D4. The samples for
demonstration are chosen from the test set of OULU-NPU on protocol 1.
5 Conclusions
We reformulate the FAS in an anomaly detection perspective and assume the
live samples belong to a closed-set while the spoof samples are outliers from this
closed-set belonging to an open-set. We define the spoof cues as the discrimi-
native live-spoof differences and propose a residual learning framework to learn
the generalized spoof cues. Our network consists of a spoof cue generator and an
auxiliary classifier. In spoof cue generator we impose weak implicit constraint on
the spoof samples to guide the proposed network to learn more generalized spoof
cues, the auxiliary classifier makes the spoof cues more discriminative and fur-
ther boosts the spoof cues’ generalizability. We conduct extensive experiments
on popular datasets and the experimental results show that our method achieves
state-of-the-art performance for face anti-spoofing.
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